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Privacy and Connected Objects
Nicolas Karsenti

INTRODUCTION
Our society perennially seeks to multiply its connectivity in the name of
greater efficiency. Over the past few years, several devices that had previously
been quite basic have been made ‘‘smarter” in order to facilitate a consumer’s
life. A recent study highlights that some of the most common reasons for using
‘‘smart” objects are home automation and remote control. 1 Thus, convenience is
driving companies, particularly appliance makers, to connect their devices to the
internet in order to make them ‘‘smart”. 2 These range from intelligent
thermostats, smart fridges, connected pacemakers, smart watches and personal
assistants (PAs) such as Alexa, Siri or Cortana, which exist within most devices
of their parent companies. While innovation is the engine of the future, one has
to wonder whether these recent advancements bring us too close to the Dickian
and Orwellian futures we have been warned about for decades. The fear was
never that we would get too advanced, since technological advancements are
usually inherently positive, but rather that our penchant for an ever-present
connection would strip us of our intimacy. The paper explores the privacy
concerns that emerge from connected objects. More specifically, it examines how
these objects fit within the framework of Quebec’s privacy legislation, as well as
Canada’s federal privacy legislation. It also seeks to highlight the current flaws in
the application of this framework to connected objects.

1. TECHNICAL OVERVIEW OF CONNECTED OBJECTS AND DATA
COLLECTION
a. Definition
The first step in understanding the flaws in current privacy legislation is to
define a smart object. Although there are varied definitions of a smart object, this
paper relies on the version used by Mattern and Floerkemeier:
Objects which using sensors, are able to perceive their context, and via
built-in networking capabilities would be able to communicate with
each other, access Internet services and interact with people.3
1

2

3

Eric Zeng, Shrirang Mare & Franziska Roesner, ‘‘End User Security and Privacy
Concerns with Smart Homes” (Paper included in the Proceedings of the Thirteenth
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, July 2017) 65 at 68.
Peter Milley, ‘‘Privacy and the Internet of Things” (2017) SANS Institute Information
Security Reading Room at 3.
Friedemann Mattern & Christian Floerkemeier, ‘‘From the Internet of Computers to the
Internet of Things” in Kai Sachs, Ilia Petov & Pablo Guerrero, eds, From Active Data
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Through the study of these objects, we will see that there exists a lack of
compatibility with the current privacy framework. Smart objects can perform
numerous tasks, and their ‘‘connected” status stems from their ability to
communicate with each other, identify each other, locate themselves, transform
electrical signals into real-life movement, and even store conversations to
sharpen the effectiveness of future interactions (and publicity). 4 Underlining
these functions is the ability to perceive their surroundings, to take decisions
based on the data they collect, and to transmit this data.5 Recently, IBM’s CEO
put forward the idea of a ‘‘Smart Earth” where every resource is connected for
maximum efficiency.6 But technology comes at a price.

b. Data Collection
A further study of how connected objects obtain data provides insight into
the potential conflicts with the current privacy framework. Smart objects are
built with sensors to interact with the environment and have the capability to
cater to consumer needs.7 Sensors process information and then store a smaller
record of it on the cloud — through a technique called edge computing. 8 This
cloud is often protected by very basic security measures.9 As inconsequential as
the data may seem, even the most innocuous information can be intrusive and
dangerous. Ranger summarizes it best:
Take the smart home: it can tell when you wake up (when the smart
coffee machine is activated) and how well you brush your teeth (thanks
to your smart toothbrush), what radio station you listen to (thanks to
your smart speaker), what type of food you eat (thanks to your smart
oven or fridge), what your children think (thanks to their smart toys),
and who visits you and passes by your house (thanks to your smart
doorbell).10

4
5

6

7
8

9

10

Management to Event-Based Systems and More (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2010) 242 at
242.
Ibid.
Md Mahmud Hossain, Maziar Fotouhi & Ragib Hasan, ‘‘Towards an Analysis of
Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the Internet of Things” (Paper
included in the Proceedings of the IEEE World Congress on Services, June 2015) 21.
Ivan Ganchev, Zhanlin Ji & Mairtin O’Droma ‘‘A Generic IoT Architecture for Smart
Cities” (Paper included in the Proceedings of the Joint 25th IET Irish Signals & Systems
Conference and China-Ireland International Conference on Information and Communications Technologies, June 2014) 196.
Hossain, supra note 5 at 2.
Xio Technologies, ‘‘IoT Edge Computing: Architected for Performance and Reliability”, White Paper (June 2017) at 2.
Stephen Ornes, ‘‘Core Concept: The Internet of Things and the Explosion of
Interconnectivity” (2016) 113:40 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1059.
Steve Ranger, ‘‘What is the IoT? Everything You Need to Know about the Internet of
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In line with this idea, recent studies have demonstrated that regular items not
usually associated with tremendous security risks, such as lightbulbs or smoke
detectors, are extremely vulnerable to attacks.11 This suggests that significant
privacy issues emerge from connected objects. Some stem from the potential
misuse by a company,12 but others stem from the fact that the information on
these devices is often protected by a flawed security system.13 Until recently,
companies would install only the most basic security, such as using ‘‘guest” for
the login and password,14 largely based on the fact that most consumers do not
know how to secure their smoke detector or their thermostat, if the option even
exists. This tendency stems from a market failure for investment in
cybersecurity.15 Consumers bear the brunt of the costs when a breach occurs,
while companies face few costs for failing to provide a secure environment and
obtain very little return on investment when they do.16 Verizon published a
report which demonstrated that almost all of the vulnerabilities exploited had
been made public for more than a year.17
Excellent examples of flawed security practices have emerged in recent years,
particularly in the United States. A company named TRENDnet sold home
cameras connected to smart phones and the internet. 18 Their security system was
so basic that at one point anyone with the IP address of one of their cameras
could, with a little tweaking, view a live feed and listen into the consumer’s
house.19 Another camera maker, D-Link, had hardcoded the username and
password of every camera to be ‘‘guest”, had left a private key code to access
their system on a publicly available website for six months, and had forgotten to
encode users’ credentials on their mobile app, leaving this information as a clear
readable packet.20 In a different area of connected objects, ASUSTek Computing

11
12

13
14

15

16
17

18

19
20

Things Right Now” (21 August 2018) ZDNet, online: <www.zdnet.com/article/whatis-the-internet-of-things-everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/>.
Zeng, supra note 1 at 68.
Kaivan Karimi & Gary Atkinson, ‘‘What the Internet of Things (IoT) Needs to Become a
Reality” (2014) White Paper of Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. and ARM, Inc. at 4,
online: <www.mouser.com/pdfdocs/INTOTHNGSWP.PDF>.
Milley, supra note 2 at 3.
Federal Trade Commission v. D-Link Corporation & D-Link Systems Inc., 2018 WL
6040192 (N.D. Cal. 2018) [‘‘D-Link”].
Michael Kende, ‘‘Global Internet Report 2016” (Internet Society: 2016) at 18, online:
<www.internetsociety.org/globalinternetreport/2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/
ISOC_GIR_2016-v1.pdf>.
Ibid.
Verizon, ‘‘2016 Data Breach Investigations Report” (Verizon: 2016) at 15-16, online:
<enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/2016/DBIR_2016_Report.pdf>
TRENDnet Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 12-CV-1223090 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
[‘‘TRENDnet”].
Ibid.
D-Link, supra note 14.
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had similarly faulty security. They made smart routers.21 These routers gave the
consumers access to cloud computing, that it claimed was secure. 22 Yet, anyone
could access the user’s personal cloud when typing in the associated URL into a
browser.23 Furthermore, the router had a default setting that made ‘‘admin” the
administrator’s account username and password.24 These are only a few
examples of a recent trend of inadequate security for connected devices.
The data that a company gathers can be used to identify the user’s habits, 25
and this information could be used or sold without the user’s knowledge. One of
the greatest risks is a hacker learning about a person’s life habits, including how
often they drink coffee or when they open their garage door, which could lead to
major security issues.26 Major privacy risks also lie within PAs.27 PAs exist to
simplify the most mundane of tasks, from ordering a pizza to changing the
colour of your lightbulb.28 They are activated by a keyword (be it ‘Hey Siri’ or
‘Hey Google’), are directly connected to online marketplaces, and often have
access to our credit cards or our calendars.29 Although they are not always
recording, they are constantly listening, potentially turning them into tiny spies
within our homes for a malicious user who manages to activate their key word at
a distance.30 Since smart objects are a treasure trove of personal data on users,
they must be properly secured and used by the companies that make them, 31 in
order to protect them from hackers attracted to the potential of these simple
machines, most recently as bots for sophisticated attacks. 32

21

22
23
24
25

26

27

28
29
30
31
32

Re ASUSTeK Computer Inc., Federal Trade Commission file no 142 3156 (settled 2016),
online: <www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/142-3156/asustek-computerinc-matter> [‘‘ASUSTeK”].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ruby R Dholakia & Nikhilesh Dholakia, ‘‘Scholarly Research in Marketing: Trends and
Challenges in the Era of Big Data” (2013) William A Orme Working Paper Series No
2013/14 10, online: <web.uri.edu/business/files/Encycl-Communication-DataMiningn-Marketing-.pdf>.
Alexandra Gheorghe, ‘‘The Internet of Things: Risks in the Connected Home” (2016)
Bitdefender Research Paper, online: <www.bitdefender.com/files/News/file/Bitdefender-2016-IoT-A4-04_en.pdf>.
Xinyu Lei et al, ‘‘The Insecurity of Home Digital Voice Assistants — Amazon Alexa as a
Case Study” (2018) arXiv Paper No 1712.03327v2, online: <arxiv.org/pdf/
1712.03327.pdf>.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Hyunji Chung et al, ‘‘Alexa, Can I Trust You?” (2017) 50:9 Computer 100.
Aliya Ramji et al, ‘‘Managing Big Data Privacy and Security” (2017) 46:1 Int’l L News 1.
Chung, supra note 30 at 7.
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2. QUEBEC-CANADA LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
CONNECTED OBJECTS
We dissected the legal framework in Quebec for private organizations into
two parts. The Canadian federal government has a privacy law, the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA).33 Similarly to
other provinces, which are not the subject of this paper, Quebec has adopted a
privacy law of its own, The Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information
in the Private Sector.34 In 2002, the Government of Canada published the
Process for the Determination of “Substantially Similar” Provincial Legislation by
the Governor in Council.35 This exempted organizations from PIPEDA when they
were subject to provincial legislation that was judged to be substantially similar to
PIPEDA with respect to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information
occurring within that province. PIPEDA continues to apply in cases of a federal
work, or when the data is collected outside the province. Thus, we will study the
regulatory compliance of connected objects with regard to both of these laws.
In 2000, the Canadian law on privacy, PIPEDA, was passed.36 It was created
to protect people’s personal information when it is collected, used or disclosed by
organizations, while also acknowledging the need for them to do so at times. 37
The act applies to any commercial activity where personal information is used,
collected or disclosed.38
The privacy framework of Quebec is set out in the Act respecting the
protection of personal information in the private sector (the Act).39 This Act must
be read hand-in-hand with article 4 of the Charter of human rights and freedoms,
articles 35 to 40 of the Code civil du Que´bec (CCQ),40 as well as the Act to
establish a legal framework for information technology.41 The Court of Appeals
has affirmed,42 and reaffirmed,43 the quasi-constitutional status of the Act,44 and
33

34

35

36
37
38
39
40
41
42

43

44

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[‘‘PIPEDA”].
Act Respecting the Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c. P39.1 [‘‘QC Private Sector Privacy Act”].
Process for the Determination of Substantially Similar Provincial Legislation by the
Governor in Council (2002) Canada Gazette 2385.
PIPEDA, supra note 33.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 3.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 4(a).
QC Private Sector Privacy Act, supra note 34.
Code Civil du Que´bec, C.Q.L.R. c. CCQ-1991 at ss. 35-41 [‘‘CCQ”].
Act to establish a legal framework for information technology, C.Q.L.R. c. C-1.1.
Québec (Commission d’acce`s à l’information) c. ArcelorMittal Montre´al inc., 2016
QCCA 1336, 2016 CarswellQue 7704 (Q.C. C.A.) [‘‘ArcelorMittal”].
Drouin c. 9179-3588 Que´bec inc., 2013 QCCA 2146, 2013 CarswellQue 12649 (Q.C. C. A.)
[‘‘Drouin”].
ArcelorMittal, supra note 42 at para 52; Drouin, supra note 43 at para 51.
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the Supreme Court has recognized the quasi-constitutional status of privacy
laws.45 As stated above, it was deemed to be ‘‘substantially similar” to PIPEDA
by the Governor in Council, in accordance with s. 26(2)(b) of PIPEDA.46 This
exempts organizations that fall under the purview of the Act from complying
with PIPEDA while collecting, using or disclosing information within the
province of Quebec.47 Many of the principles found in PIPEDA are also present
in the Act, therefore they will be presented side by side in an effort to avoid
repetition, as well as to highlight the differences and their impact on connected
objects.
In PIPEDA, a commercial activity is defined as ‘‘any particular transaction,
act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character
[. . .].”48 The test, laid out by the Supreme Court in Regional Assessment
Commisioner v. Caisse Populaire de Hearst, is ‘‘whether it [the organization] has
as its preponderant purpose the making of a profit.”49 As the parent companies
and manufacturers of these connected objects easily fit within this definition,
there is no need to delve further into its complexities.
While PIPEDA employs the notion of commercial activity, the Act uses the
CCQ’s concept of organized economic activity.50 This notion is larger, as it also
applies to unions, lawyers and physicians.51
Personal information is defined, in the context of PIPEDA, as ‘‘information
about an identifiable individual.”52 This creates ‘‘a very elastic definition”53
which encapsulates a lot of information. The key component to information
fitting in this definition is identifiability, 54 the ‘‘data elements must be
attributable to a specific individual.”55 In the Gordon case,56 the Federal
Court accepted the following test, submitted by the Privacy Commissionner:

45
46

47
48
49

50
51

52
53

54
55
56

Douez v. Facebook, Inc, 2017 SCC 33, 2017 CarswellBC 1663 (S.C.C.).
Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order, SOR/2003-374; PIPEDA,
supra note 33 at s. 26(2)(b).
Ibid.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 2(1).
Ontario (Regional Assessment Commisioner) v. Caisse Populaire de Hearst Lte´e, [1983] 1
S.C.R. 57 at 70, 1983 CarswellOnt 563 (S.C.C.).
CCQ, supra note 40 at art. 1525(3).
Michael Power, The Law of Privacy in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada,
2017) at section 4.5.4.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 2(1).
Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance, 2011 ONCA 3, 2011 CarswellOnt 6 (O.N. C.A.) at
para 22.
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.1.2.A.
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.1.2.A.
Gordon v. Canada (Health), 2008 CarswellNat 522, [2008] F.C.J. No. 331, 2008 FC 258
(F.C. T.D.).
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Information will be about an identifiable individual where there is a
serious possibility that an individual could be identified through the use
of that information, alone or in combination with other available
information.57

The courts have also used the same test negatively, asking whether ‘‘a person will
be identifiable if the information disclosed, together with other publicly available
information, would tend to or possibly identify them”.58
The Act has a similar scope, as it applies to any personal information
collected, used, disclosed or communicated in the course of an enterprise within
the meaning of the CCQ.59 It defines personal information as ‘‘any information
which relates to a natural person and allows that person to be identified”. 60 This
has been clarified by the courts, and the Commission d’acce`s à l’information, as
any information which: ‘‘(i) permits someone to learn something; (ii) relates to a
natural person; and (iii) is capable of identifying the person.”61 The Act excludes
from its scope information which is made publicly available by law. 62
Information about an object relating to the person is not necessarily personal
information as it can only identify indirectly, 63 but the combination of
information on the object and the person can bring it under the scope of the
Act.64
When considering the case for the personal data collected by connected
objects, we look at previously identified areas of personal information. The
Privacy Commissioner has found that personal information encapsulates: IP
addresses (in certain cases);65 device identifier information;66 mobile subscriber
57
58

59
60
61
62

63

64

65

66

Ibid at para. 34-35.
Girao v. Zerek Taylor Grossman Hanrahan LLP, 2011 FC 1070, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1310
(F.C. T.D.) at para 32.
QC Private Sector Privacy Act, supra note 34 at s. 1.
QC Private Sector Privacy Act, supra note 34 at s. 2.
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.5.5.
Champagne c. Caisse populaire Desjardins de la Valle´e du Gouffre, 2002 QCCAI 186, 2002
CarswellQue 3772 (C.A.I. Qué.).
Cie d’assurances ING du Canada c. Marcoux, 2006 QCCQ 6387, 2006 CarswellQue 6142
(C.Q.) at para 27.
J.C. c. SSQ, socie´te´ d’assurances ge´ne´rales inc., 2017 QCCAI 129, 2017 CarswellQue
13061 (C.A.I. Qué.) at para 37.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Assistant Commissioner Recommends
Bell Canada Inform Customers about Deep Packet Inspection, PIPEDA Report of
Findings #2009-010 (September 2009), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-anddecisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2009/2009_010_rep_0813/>
[‘‘OPC re Bell Canada”].
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Investigation into the Personal
Information Handling Practices of WhatsApp Inc., PIPEDA Report of Findings
#2013-001 (15 January 2013), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2013/PIPEDA-2013-001/>; Power, supra
note 51 at s. 4.1.2.A.
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ID;67 mobile network and country code;68 payload data from unsecured wireless
networks collected inadvertently;69 the individual’s name70 and email address.71
Of particular interest for connected objects, especially PA’s, is that the Privacy
Commissioner considers the characteristics of a person’s voice to be personal
information.72 It is seen as biometric information, and is thus more sensitive,
similarly to a fingerprint or an iris pattern.73
Another important qualification is with regard to Online Behavioural
Advertising. In the Privacy Commission’s Policy Position on Online Behavioural
Advertising, the position taken was that while most of the information captured
(third-party tracking cookies, IP addresses, browser settings) is not personal, the
cumulative effect of this mass of information could make it identifiable, and thus
personal.74 The vast quantities of data gathered by connected objects, which can
highlight several key aspects of an individual’s life, offer strikingly similar
parallels. Indeed, as the Privacy Engineer’s Manifesto suggests, ‘‘if you can
access, correlate, and associate identity and activity in the IoT, you will pretty
much be able to write a biography that will shock mothers and end marriages”. 75
Thus, the information gathered by connected objects could be considered
personal information because of its range.76

67
68
69

70

71

72

73
74

75

76

Ibid.
Ibid.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Google Inc. WiFi Data Collection,
PIPEDA Report of Findings #2011-001 (20 May 2011), <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opcactions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2011/PIPEDA2011-001/>.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Bank Provides Former Employee with
Insufficient Access to his Personal Information, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2013-004
(18 July 2013) at paras 82-87, online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2013/PIPEDA-2013-004/>.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Joint Investigation of Ashley Madison by
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and the Australian Privacy Commissioner/Acting
Australian Information Commissioner, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2016-005 (22
August 2016) at paras 146-149, online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2016/PIPEDA-2016-005/>.
Turner v. Telus Communications Inc., 2005 FC 1601, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1981 (F.C.) at
para. 22.
Ibid at para 12.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Policy Position on Online Behavioural
Advertising” (December 2015), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/advertising-and-marketing/behaviouraltargeted-advertising/bg_ba_1206/>.
Michelle Dennedy, Jonathan Fox & Thomas R Finneran, The Privacy Engineer’s
Manifesto, (New York: Apress, 2014) at 17.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘The Internet of Things: An
Introduction to Privacy Issues with a focus on the Retail and Home Environments”
(February 2016), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/media/1808/iot_201602_e.pdf> [‘‘OPC on
IoT”].
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Before diving further into the core principles of these laws, a last point is of
note. With regard to PIPEDA, the Privacy Commissioner has no extraterritorial
powers per se. Initially, the pursuit of investigations regarding companies outside
of Canada was seen as outside the scope of the Commissioner’s purview. 77 In
2007, the Federal Court ruled that the Privacy Commissioner did have the power
‘‘to investigate complaints relating to the transborder flow of personal
information”.78 This reasoning was based on the Canadian component of the
information collected, in order to create a psychological profile. 79 The data had
been sculpted in the US, but it had originated from Canada, and thus the Privacy
Commissioner had the right to investigate whether this data collection complied
with PIPEDA.80 The ‘‘real and substantial link” theory was used broadly in the
case of an online foreign organization by the court in A.T. v. Globe24h.com81 for
the purposes of applying PIPEDA. This principle could also apply to connected
objects where Canadian data is uploaded to foreign servers.
Also, s. 5(1) of PIPEDA obliges organizations to comply with Schedule 1 of
PIPEDA.82 This schedule is a series of principles that come from the CSA Model
Code for the Protection of Personal Information.83 We discuss these principles
further below. Additionally to these constraints, s. 5(3) of PIPEDA subjugates
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information to ‘‘purposes that a
reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances”. 84 This
obligation is one of the most significant in the act.85 It subjugates the consent of a
person towards their information to an objective standard of reasonableness.86
This standard was set out by the Court in Eastman v. Canadian Pacific Railway.87
The test was created by the Privacy Commissioner to determine whether there
was a violation of s. 5(3).88 The four questions are :
.
.
.
.

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

84
85
86
87
88

Is
Is
Is
Is

the measure demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need?
it likely to be effective in meeting that need?
the loss of privacy proportional to the benefit gained?
there a less privacy-invasive way of achieving the same end?89

Lawson v. Accusearch Inc., 2007 FC 125, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 314 (F.C.) at para 14.
Ibid at para 51.
Ibid at paras 38-43.
Ibid.
A.T. v. Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114, 2017 CarswellNat 184 (F.C.) at paras. 47-64.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 5(1).
Canadian Standards Association, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information,
(1996) CAN/CSA-Q830-96.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at s. 5(3).
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.1.6.
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.1.6.
Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2004 FC 852, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1043 (F.C.).
Ibid at para 13.
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Subsequent cases have used this test, or variants of it, when facing allegations of
s. 5(3) violations.90
The 10 principles outlined in Schedule 10 are the core of PIPEDA.91 They do
not focus on preventing the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information, but rather on the purposes for which this information is used. 92
For the purpose of this paper, we have targeted certain fundamental categories of
privacy law that would be most affected by connected objects and the IoT.
The first category is consent, which is the core and first step of any privacy
legislation. This is represented by s. 4.3 of PIPEDA.93 The second category is
collection, especially limiting its breadth, represented by principles 4.4. 94 The
third is safeguarding the information, which is especially difficult to uphold in a
connected world. It is represented by s. 4.7 of PIPEDA.95 The penultimate
category is exactitude, which requires both the accuracy of the information and
access to it. It is highlighted by ss. 4.6 and 4.9 of PIPEDA.96 The last category,
accountability, is overarching, as it applies to every step of the privacy cycle. It is
part of s. 4.1 of PIPEDA.97

Consent
Consent is the act of accepting that an organization may collect some data
for specified purposes.98 Consent is always required except in rare circumstances
that will not be discussed here. Furthermore, consent cannot be given to
explanations that are too vague and sweeping,99 since the individual cannot
‘‘reasonably understand how the information will be used or disclosed”. 100 Many
consumers are completely unaware of the data collected by their connected
89
90

91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98
99

100

Ibid.
As an example of the same test see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Law
School Admission Council Investigation: Executive Summary, PIPEDA Case Summary
#389 (29 May 2008), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2008/exec_080529/>; for a variation on this test see
Turner, supra note 72 at para 23.
Power, supra note 51 at s. 4.1.
Englander v. Telus Communications Inc., 2004 FCA 387, [2005] 2 F.C.R. 572 (F.C.A.) at
para 42.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at sched. 1 s. 4.3.
Ibid at sched. 1 s. 4.4.
Ibid at sched. 1 s. 4.7.
Ibid at sched. 1 ss. 4.6, 4.9.
Ibid at sched. 1 s. 4.1.
Ibid at sched. 1 s. 4.3.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Bank Adopts Sweeping Changes to its
Information Collection Practices, PIPEDA Case Summary #2002-97 (30 September
2002), online: <www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2002/PIPEDA-2002-097/>.
PIPEDA, supra note 33 at sched. 1 s 4.3.2.
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objects.101 Indeed, the trend is towards smaller objects, bracelets and lightbulbs
for example, that do not possess the interface to communicate the consent of the
user yet amass mountains of data.102
An organization cannot require consent to data collection in order to use the
product or service, beyond what is required to fulfill legitimate purposes. Thus,
obtaining the SIN of a person cannot be a requirement to obtaining internet 103 or
banking services.104 This limit is nuanced by organizational security concerns,
and the utility of more sensitive information in enhancing security measures. 105
Consent can either be implicit or explicit.106 Consent to collect can thus be
opt-in or opt-out. Opt-in requires express consent to gather data. Opt-out
requires positive action for the gathering to cease. For an organization to use
opt-out consent, it must pass a four-part test.107 The organization must
demonstrate that the information is not sensitive ‘‘in nature and context”. 108 The
information-sharing situation must be well-defined and regulated in terms of the
scope of the personal information that could be shared.109 The purposes ‘‘must
be limited and well-defined, stated in a reasonably clear and understandable
manner, and brought to the individual’s attention at the time the personal
information is collected”.110 Lastly, the opt-out process must be convenient.111
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When information is likely to be considered sensitive, consent should be explicit,
and thus opt-in.112 Due to the very sensitive nature of the data captured by
connected objects, especially in the case of connected homes,113 explicit consent
could be required more often. The use of customer data with usage information
for targeted ads was found by the Privacy Commissioner to require opt-in
consent. This could potentially apply to connected objects which collect data on
usage, have personal customer information, and use this combined data for
targeted advertisement.
Even when consent is given, ‘‘binary, one-time consent and traditional
definitions of personal information are increasingly perceived as outdated”. 114
Privacy law is trending towards requiring a flexible method of consent that can
be given throughout the object’s lifespan, and ‘‘simplistic, ‘on/off’ personal data
management policies may be neither flexible, nor appropriate, in the fastdeveloping online environment”.115 Article 29 Working Party of the EU
addressed the issue of consent in connected objects, noting that in the case of
smart watches, the opacity of their data collection system caused ‘‘‘low-quality’
consent based in a lack of information or in the factual impossibility to provide
fine-tuned consent in line with the preferences expressed by individuals”.116
Provincially, consent is outlined in s. 14 of the Act. It differs from the consent
required in PIPEDA, which has a dual opt-in and opt-out approach depending
on the sensitivity of the information. The Act requires that consent be ‘‘manifest,
free, and enlightened, and [. . .] given for specific purposes”. 117 It must also be
limited to the time necessary to accomplish the aforementioned goals. 118
The high level of consent required is thus extremely hard to meet with
implicit consent.119 The Commission d’acce`s à l’information (CAI) wrote that an
individual dealing with a bank had given manifest consent because it was written,
specific, limited in time, and the objective of the data collection was well
understood by the person and well-defined by the notice which they signed.120 In
the context of connected objects, this will make consent more difficult to obtain.
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A recent Australian study highlighted the difficulties of obtaining ‘‘meaningful”
consent with current connected objects.121 Participants reported that most
objects had mandatory opt-in policies in order to use them.122 They also felt lost
when trying to understand most consent forms, creating uncertainty as to the
quality of their consent.123 Recommendations were made to have ‘‘multiple
points of consent with the ability to revoke earlier forms of consent or opt out if
necessary along the data use life-cycle”.124
For the consent to be complete, organizations must identify the purpose(s) of
their data collection, and they must keep a trail of their collection for later
justification, if need be.125 The avowed goal of identifying the purposes behind
the collection is to limit the capture of unnecessary data.126 Organizations should
communicate the reasons for the data collection to the individual, at the time of
or before.127 Inadequacy in communicating purposes is often cited by the Privacy
Commissioner as a failure.128
For example, an airplane company had collected information for lost
baggage.129 The purposes identified were tracing the baggage and creating a basis
for the claim.130 The information sought included the person’s Social Security
number and employment situation.131 This information was not necessary to the
baggage tracing system, nor the claim’s system.132 Thus, this collection violated
PIPEDA.133 In 2009, the Commission found that Facebook’s default privacy
settings violated this principle because the purposes of the data collected through
these settings was not properly explained to users.134 The same syllogism could
121
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be applied to connected objects. The purposes of the data collected through the
default privacy settings, and through a change in them, would have to be
explained to the user. If an organization identifies a new use for a particular
information, the purpose sharing process must be repeated with the user.135
Provincially, according to the Act, an enterprise may only collect
information for a ‘‘serious and legitimate reason”. 136 There must be a
‘‘legitimate and justifiable link”137 between the information gathered and the
activities of the enterprise. The information must also be ‘‘necessary” 138 although
the term ‘‘relevant” was also used with regard to Article 37 CCQ. ‘‘Necessary”
was defined in opposition to what is ‘‘superfluous, without object nor
pertinence”.139 When creating a folder of information on an individual, the
enterprise’s goal must be determined, articulated and recorded. 140 During the
creation of the file, the enterprise must also communicate three elements to the
person:
(1) the object of the file;
(2) the use which will be made of the information and the categories of
persons who will have access to it within the enterprise;
(3) the place where the file will be kept and the rights of access and
rectification.141

Collection
This principle requires that organizations only capture the information
necessary to fulfill the purpose identified by them, and for which they obtained
consent.142 A failure to find appropriate purposes will result in a collection that
also infringes on this principle.143 In Quebec, an enterprise may only establish a
file for a serious and legitimate reason.144 Thus, the collection is limited to the
motives behind the establishment of the file.145 Information collected in violation
of other privacy laws will not qualify as a collection under the act. 146
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The idea of limiting the collection of data runs contrary to the purpose of
connected objects. At their core, they seek to collect the most data possible. In an
average supermarket, 544 TB of data per day could be collected. 147 Smart objects
are filled with sensors that constantly collect data on their environment, 148 and
this data is used to improve the decision-making skills of the machines (through
neural networks and deep learning).149 Problems emerge when a line has to be
drawn between the information that is crucial to the purposes of the
organization, and that which is superfluous. Almost anything can be included
under umbrella purpose terms such as ‘‘improving the user’s life”, especially with
the recent advances in machine-learning, which require large data-sets for the
machine to become more effective in its interactions. 150

Safeguards
This principle is a headache for technologists in the context of connected
objects. It demands that personal information be protected by security
safeguards equivalent to the quality of the information. The security measures
required by PIPEDA are very similar to those included in the Act. Security
proportional to the sensitivity, purpose and quantity of the information is also
the rule.151 With the multitude of sensors within connected objects, even the most
minute details can be used to identify a person and their intimate habits.
Organizations are in a rush to market new products. Security ‘‘is often an
afterthought in the architecture of many wide spread IoT devices”. 152 Thus, at
times, simple security measures are lacking from known household products.
This has already enabled several hackers to take advantage of weak security
systems to form botnets.153 A recent study found that certain devices do not even
use a Secure Socket Layer connection, a basic security standard for internet
147
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navigation.154 Most devices did not provide for the possibility of an update to
face zero-day vulnerabilities, thus denying themselves the chance to patch their
systems and re-secure their customers.155 Another study found that most
wearable connected objects did not change MAC addresses, enabling any
bystander to persistently track the user.156 Furthermore, many devices use the
most basic combination of username and password, with the user being excluded
from changing them, making these devices particularly vulnerable. The world
was made brutally aware of this fact with the explosion of Mirai attacks. 157
Originally developed by an American college student, these intrusions were first
used to hack 600,000 devices with a combination of 61 common usernames and
passwords,158 and have since been further complexified.159
Another important facet of security protection is the recent Digital Privacy
Act (also known as Bill S-4).160 A key component of this law is the creation of
mandatory data breach reporting obligations,161 which became a concern for the
public following the Yahoo162 and eBay163 data leak scandals. When an
organization experiences a breach in security safeguards that affects personal
information under its control, it now faces certain requirements. 164 For these to
be triggered, the incident must create ‘‘a real risk of significant harm to an
individual”.165 This risk must be evaluated with regard to the quality of the
154
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information involved and whether ‘‘it is reasonable under the circumstances to
believe”166 it will be misused.167 A real risk implies a risk which is never
theoretical nor abstract.168 When an organization determines that a real risk of
significant harm exists, it must notify the affected individuals, as well as the
Privacy Commissioner, ‘‘as soon as feasibly possible”. 169
An issue with the formulation of this component of the act is the lack of
reporting with regard to small breaches which may pose no reasonable risk of
harm to a single individual, but expose a more universal flaw with the system at
hand.170 This criticism is particularly relevant with regard to connected devices,
which are more likely to contain inherent flaws and zero-day vulnerabilities. This
could, in turn, lead to the systemic exploitation of flaws that did not meet the
test, and thus were not initially reported.
In Quebec, the Act has no mandatory reporting obligations.171 The CAI
merely provides resources when breaches occur, as well as a voluntary reporting
system.172 Among its recommendations, there is a six-part checklist to deal with
breaches, which essentially mirrors the obligations of Bill S-4. 173 The CAI
identified the lack of legal reporting or notification obligations, beyond the
general rules of civil responsibility,174 as an issue that the government should
address.175 For now, consumers are at risk of being kept in the dark when their
connected devices, and the data they contain, are breached. With the plethora of
risks associated with stolen information,176 this is a glaring wart on Quebec’s
privacy protection regime.
Another problem has emerged with regard to safeguards, in the form of
third-party access and use of information. In a 2009 report by the Privacy
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Commissioner on Facebook,177 it was emphasized that contractual safeguards
were not sufficient when dealing with information held by third party
developers.178 Concrete technological solutions should be used to prevent them
from gaining ‘‘unauthorized access to personal information that they do not
need”.179
A last issue exists with regard to tampering. Several wearable connected
devices contain sensitive data that has been used in court cases,180 or could be
one day used for insurance premiums.181 This implies that the data was securely
obtained and recorded, yet many of these devices do not contain any protection
against user tampering.182 A team of researchers had a test subject using a
popular wearable connected device send data to the company stating that they
had taken 10 billion steps in a single day.183
This further demonstrates that the list of chinks in the armour of connected
objects is seemingly never-ending. The compliance issues between connected
objects and this principle will only grow as they become omnipresent in our lives.
This potential clash is fundamental to the debate concerning connected objects,
since they can reveal people’s most intimate ‘‘lifestyles, habits and choices”. 184

Exactitude
This principle has two components. One requires that users have access to
their information, and the other requires that this information be accurate.
Firstly, it requires that organizations present the information regarding their
privacy policies in a format users can access and understand. 185 The same
principle exists in the Code civil du Que´bec.186 The information should include the
people responsible for privacy within the organization, which information is
captured, how it is used, and how it is shared.187 A recent assessment of online
privacy policies has found a significant percentage of organizations to lack either
a privacy policy, privacy contact, or explanations as to the use, collection and
disclosure of information and the company’s compliance with applicable privacy
laws.188
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With regard to connected objects, the same problems are present. For
instance, a few organizations with wearable connected objects did not have an
available privacy policy.189 Among those that did, a few had several different
privacy policies depending on the app used with the connected device, leaving
users in a fog as to the applicable policy.190 Many of them referenced other legal
documents with different guidelines.191 All of them lacked clear explanations of
key areas of privacy, such as the applicable law, how long the data was retained,
security, the circumstances in which it could be shared to a third party, as well as
access and correction practices.192
This principle also requires organizations to inform people, upon request, as
to whether they hold any personal information.193 If there is personal
information, they must also give access to this information.194 Technical
difficulties in obtaining this data or the relevance of the information are not
acceptable reasons to refuse a request.195 The individual’s demand to obtain their
personal information must be made in writing according to PIPEDA.196 If the
individual feels that not all the information was revealed or found, they must
‘‘establish at least a prima facie case that the search was inadequate”.197 The data
must be given at little or no cost and must be generally understandable. 198 In
Quebec, this same principle of access applies.199 Although free access to the
information must be given, a reasonable cost can be required for its
reproduction.200 An organization may refuse to share information if it falls
under certain exceptions,201 and the dispositions of the Code civil du Que´bec
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cannot be used to circumvent these restrictions.202 These restrictions are specified
in the Act,203 but they stem from the larger definition of Article 39 CCQ,204
which allows for a refusal based on serious and legitimate reasons, or when the
information may cause serious harm to another person.205
Recent studies by the Citizen Lab have highlighted the laborious and often
inadequate efforts by organizations with connected objects to comply with this
principle.206 In all cases, the connected objects were health wearables that had the
capacity to collect massive amounts of data, as they were with the user at almost
all times. Only a few companies had explicit policies regarding access to data for
the individual.207 Requests were made to each company for the data collected to
be shared in a readable format.208 Almost half did not respond to the request at
all.209 Even among those that did respond, most did not provide for all of the
individual’s collected information in a readable format. 210 This further
demonstrates the difficulties a user will face when trying to obtain this data,
and the lack of compliance with this principle by organizations with connected
devices.
The second component of this principle, accuracy, prohibits personal
information from being routinely updated. These are only allowed if the
purposes of the data gathering require it.211 The degree of accuracy required by
this principle will differ depending on the importance of accuracy when using the
information.212 A credit reporting agency, whose sole purpose is to provide a
base of information for decisions by credit guarantors, will thus have a high
threshold of accuracy.213 The commercial and practical necessities of a certain
system for an organization do not provide a defense from this principle. 214
Managing a large amount of data cannot exempt an organization from being
accurate.215 The vast amounts of information obtained from connected objects,
and the profiles of individuals created from this data, could breach this principle
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if an inaccurate profile was created, even if the quantity in question made
accuracy far more difficult.
Provincially, Article 37 of the Code Civil du Que´bec ensures that when
enterprises make a decision based on information they have collected, it must be
accurate and up to date.216 A negative mention on a credit dossier based on
inaccurate information can violate Article 37.217 This could apply in the case of
decisions based on insurance files built from wearable connected objects which
had recorded inaccurate information.

Accountability
Accountability is a blanket concept which applies to all the others. It is the
‘‘acceptance of responsibility for personal information protection”. 218 This
acceptance is expressed in PIPEDA in the form of a designated individual who is
responsible for the company’s compliance with these principles, even if others are
affected to data collection or management.219 This person is often referred to as a
privacy officer.220 Although this specific individual, or group of individuals, is
responsible for data protection within the company, this does not discharge the
company’s obligation onto these people; rather, it makes the ‘‘organization
responsible and accountable as a whole”.221 When a complaint is addressed to an
organization by a third party, it must provide the client with the relevant contact
information of the privacy officer,222 even if another employee can answer the
question or solve the issue.223
Another aspect of accountability is responsibility after transfer to a third
party.224 This forces the organization, when transferring the data to a third
party, to ensure that comparable measures of protection are in place.225 A certain
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amount of control by the organization is required when using a subcontractor or
a service provider.226 A 2012 report by the Privacy Commissioners of Alberta
and Canada stated that, at the very least, service providers should be
contractually bound to comply with the organization’s privacy provisions. 227
The issue of accountability faces multiple shortcomings. Even if we were to
assume that companies had effective privacy policies with privacy officers in
place, people would be hard pressed to know where to turn. Connected objects
are constantly communicating, and several complimentary actors are involved in
the data retention and collection.228 The data is often processed through ‘‘an
unobtrusive and seamless infrastructure in which connected devices typically lack
user interfaces and the communication of data is invisible”.229 Thus, it is more
complicated to hold any single actor responsible. Mapping data flows will be
primordial in assessing responsibilities 230 and, in turn, complying to this
principle.

CONCLUSION
The Canadian privacy framework is woefully ill-equipped to face the rise in
connected objects. Resources must be dedicated to rethinking what we view as
adequate consent, how our data is collected and why, how this data is protected,
how it portrays us and what to do if the shoe does not fit, and how we will make
organizations accountable for these issues in a globalized world.
While Canada is lagging behind in terms of legislation addressing concerns
regarding IoT and connected objects, the United States of America has recently
awoken to the explosion of the IoT devices. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has a wide mandate to protect consumers in the US.231 For the past
decade, it has used its broad s. 5 powers regarding ‘‘unfair or deceptive acts or
practices” 232 to police organizations with insufficient data security. 233
Recognizing the potential dangers of connected objects, it organized a
workshop in early 2013 to discuss the issues that arose from this new IoT
wave. In January 2015, the FTC published a report in collaboration with leading
226
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technologists and academics, industry representatives, and consumer
advocates.234 The report described the axis upon which the FTC would
develop its policy on connected devices, with an emphasis on the need for
greater layered security, employee awareness, as well as a series of industry
specific self-regulatory programs.235 The participants also highlighted ‘‘the need
for substantive data security and breach notification legislation at the federal
level”.236
Following the workshop in 2013, the FTC adopted a more aggressive
strategy towards smart object makers. Using its s. 5 powers,237 It charged
TRENDnet,238 ASUSTek Computing239 and D-Link240 with failing to provide
adequate protection for their products. The FTC’s approach with regard to
security issues has thus experienced some success. This particular component
could serve as a model for Canada, at a time when its current privacy legislation
is toothless in comparison.
The FTC has more generally encouraged organizations to adopt a voluntary
data minimization, notice and consent policy.241 Companies would self-regulate
to minimize the amount of consumer data collected.242 This would occur through
a diminishment of the data collected, or through the collection of less sensitive
information, as well as de-identification procedures. 243 This approach seems
severely flawed, especially with regard to connected objects. There are doubts as
to whether de-identification is even possible,244 and there are no compliance
mechanisms to keep in check companies who collect data. While the FTC has
successfully used its power to regulate the security aspect of privacy and data
collection, it has been powerless to impose a clear form of consent and
limitations as to the size and quality of the data collected. A caveat to the
American approach is the disparity of regulations between the state and federal
levels, leaving a patchwork of regulations which can be hard for citizens to
navigate.245
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Through this thistle of inconsistent privacy legislation,246 California has been
a pioneer in data protection and reporting obligations.247 The California Civil
Code requires organizations that collect data to use ‘‘reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect
the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction use,
modification, or disclosure”.248 Since 2003, there have been notification
obligations when data breaches of specific personal information occur. 249
Diverging from the Canadian rules, these obligations are triggered by the
reasonable belief that this information has been obtained by an unauthorized
person.250 Other states have used the ‘‘harm” standard present in PIPEDA.251
Recently, in an effort to modernize its privacy framework, California has
enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.252 The definition of
personal information was broadened to ‘‘identifiable information,” mirroring the
Canadian approach.253 One component of this change should be closely
examined by Canadian authorities wishing to update current privacy
legislature to face the rising tide of connected objects. A liability rule for data
breaches was created.254 Businesses can now be held privately liable if they
inadequately secure their data, without consumers having to prove that any harm
could or did occur.255 The Attorney General has the ability to pursue these
businesses.256 Canada should also implement a form of liability, in the wake of
recent data breaches due to outdated protocols, to motivate organizations to
invest in their security and, by correlation, that of their customers.
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Dawn is breaking over a new era of social connectivity. The omnipresence of
connected objects will bring about a true IoT. This change will redefine how we
interact with others and the things we own. Such a paradigm shift will come at a
price — beleaguering intimacy into linguistic cemeteries. Definitions of privacy
and security, as well as the law, will have to evolve in order to stay economically
reasonable and relevant. Technology is always faster than the government at
adapting to the demands of today’s world. Modern organizations have very little
incentive to protect the everyday person from the multitude of security threats.
At the current breakneck speed of innovation, how will our leaders address the
issues that will redefine the next generation’s relationship with its data?

